Liversidge v Sir John Anderson: HL 3 Nov Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Abdi, Same v Same. In Rex v. Leman Street Police Station Inspector (1) it was held that art. an order made by Sir John Anderson as Home Secretary on May 26, , under reg. There was a 4/5 ruling AGAINST Liversidge in , it was ruled that no court can investigate whether the Secretary of State had reasonable.
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No one doubts that the Emergency Powers Defence Act,empowers His Majesty in Council to vest any minister with unlimited power over the person and property of the subject.
Counsel for the appellant admitted that if the House should adopt the interpretation of the regulation which I have reached the appeal must be dismissed and I concur in the motion that that be its fate. A constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he shall have good cause to suspect of having committed. Just as the fact that the act of the Secretary of State acting in a public office is prima facie evidence that he has been duly appointed to his office, so his compliance with the provision of the statute or the Order in Council under which he purported to act must be presumed unless the contrary is proved.
These, however, are but hypothetical considerations as to possible developments at a later stage of the litigation. The master very properly dismissed the summons, and the appeal against his order was dismissed by Tucker J.
It is said that it could never have been intended to substitute the decision of judges for the decision of the minister, or, as has been said, to give an appeal from the minister to the courts. State of Uttar Pradesh have allowed some measure of judicial intervention by holding that the executive’s decisions must be based on “pertinent material”; if it is found that there is no such material justifying the decision, the courts may act.
I am here only concerned with the general principles stated by this House.
Liversage v Anderson 
In the Commonwealth, many jurisdictions, particularly in the Caribbeanhave opted to follow Lord Atkin’s judgment as well. He did not proceed on any doubt as to the meaning of the regulation, which he held, if valid, vested. What is reasonable in the particular case is then determined by what the court or piversidge jury thinks reasonable.
As the administrative plenary discretion is vested in the Home.
Liversidge v Anderson – Wikipedia
I must first indicate briefly the form in which the question has come before your Lordships. But even if the view entertained by the Court of Appeal as to the production of the order be accepted, it would merely result in postponing to a later date the decision of the crucial question in the case.
In considering this the court must confine itself to the construction of the regulation, and the Secretary of State must satisfy the court that he had reasonable cause to believe what is alleged against the appellant, namely, hostile associations.
Such an action used to be described as an action for trespass vi et armis. If it is a condition to a right including a power granted to A, whenever the right comes into dispute the tribunal whatever it may be that is charged with determining the dispute must ascertain whether the condition is fulfilled.
That in general is a very salutary rule, but we are dealing here with an Act passed and regulations made under it in times of a great national emergency, and in view of this circumstance and of the objects which that Act and those regulations so plainly had in view, the courts should, in my opinion, prefer that construction which is the least likely to imperil the safety of this country. Thereupon the appellant issued a somewhat remarkable summons.
The power of arrest is confided by the common law both to constables and to private individuals.
Where, as respects any premises, it appears to any officer of police of a rank not lower than that of inspector. Secondly, I shall express my opinion on the question which strictly speaking would not arise till the trial whether the order of the Secretary of State is in the circumstances sufficient prima facie proof that the Secretary of State has acted lawfully and that the detention of the appellant was and is accordingly not illegal.
I have given my reasons for agreeing with them, and I would go anferson and say that, in view of the particulars, as to which I take it to be proved that the Secretary of State had information which he could reasonably believe, the Secretary of State has established reasonable cause for believing both the hostile associations and the necessity to control.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
It is desirable to state, so far as relevant, the Act of Parliament and the regulations under which the order for detention or the document purporting to liversudge such an order was made. If I mean to refer to some external yardstick I should in general naturally say so expressly unless the contrary was clear from other circumstances. Whether or not the acts of some individual appear to be of this description is a question of which the Secretary of State must plainly be a better judge liversldge any court of law can be.
He has in this case and in others sworn affidavits to the effect that the information he acted on was the result of reports and information from persons in responsible positions experienced in investigating matters of this kind and that he accepted their information. The appellant having been detained by or by the direction of the respondents, the onus of justifying the detention clearly lies on them. Here is indeed an impasse. Arlidge 1Lord Haldane L. The form in which that question is brought before your Lordships for decision in the present case is somewhat unusual.
His ipse dixit avails nothing. Again, it is for the court to decide if a director ajderson under the Directors Liability Act or the corresponding section of the present Companies Act for untrue statements in a prospectus can establish his defence which he cannot do by simply showing that he thought he had reasonable grounds for believing them to be true: On May 8,Master Moseley heard the application and refused to make any order thereon.
The matter is one for the executive discretion of the Secretary of State. I am confirmed in the opinion that the matter is one for executive discretion by other provisions andersln the regulation, in particular, those relating to the advisory committee or committees which are to be appointed under para. In the Greene case the circumstances are not the same.
My Lords, it is, I think, apt to lead to confusion if the question be regarded as one of onus. Were it so it would be strange that several learned judges should have found it to possess quite a different meaning. On May 22,he was detained under an order which recited that the Home Secretary had reasonable cause to believe him to be a person of hostile associations and that by reason thereof it was liversidve to exercise lievrsidge over him.
I select a list of thirteen statutes from the valuable work on Police Law by Dr. For the person who is to have reasonable cause to believe is not some minor official holding a subordinate position.
No reasons were given by the master or Tucker J. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the statement of claim are as follows: Where the information in the possession of andersob Secretary of State is anderso such a nature that this country might be seriously prejudiced if it came to the ears of the enemy, the serious risk of leakage would inevitably deter him from disclosing it. The object is plainly that of the common law and previous statutes to secure some measure of protection for the public by providing a condition which, if necessary, can be examined by the courts.
Liversage v Anderson  | Case Summary | Webstroke Law
Morrison who had succeeded Sir John as Home Secretary on October 4, as second defendant, claiming as against both defendants damages for false anserson and as against Mr. In the first place, when the decision is left to the minister or other executive authority without qualification the words omit the reference to reasonable cause.
The appellant asked for particulars of his reasonable cause to believe a as to hostile associations, b as to necessity to control him. In this connection it is not inapposite lliversidge quote the following passage from the speech of Lord Atkinson in Rex v.
Hakes 2especially by Lord Halsbury L. There was some sort of justification for seeking this alternative relief inasmuch as the refusal to admit that the detention of the appellant was unlawful impliedly asserted that it was lawful, and, accordingly, that there were in fact reasonable grounds for the belief of the Home Secretary recited in the order, assuming that, according to the true construction of the regulation, the existence in fact of such reasonable grounds was essential to the validity of the order.
There was no evidence of this kind at the hearing of this summons, and, in my opinion, the appeal ought to be allowed and an order made in the terms of the summons. They fall into two categories.
In my opinion, the appellant is not bound to rely on the traverse, though as a matter of pleading that, in my opinion, amounts to a positive allegation of authority to detain for which particulars may be asked.